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The Application and Development of the
Polluter-Pays Principle across Jurisdictions in
Liability for Marine Oil Pollution: The Tales of
the ‘Erika’ and the ‘Prestige’
Julie Adshead*
A B S T R A C T
This article charts the application and development of the Polluter-Pays Principle
(PPP) in one sphere of international law (civil liability for accidental marine oil pollu-
tion); a liability regime, very much grounded in its own traditions, which often inter-
acts uncomfortably with national and regional law. The article explores the application
of the principle at international, regional and national levels, using the demise of the
vessels ‘Erika’ and ‘Prestige’ and the case law flowing from the subsequent environmen-
tal disasters to illustrate how the principle has developed in this area of international
law and how this has the potential to influence its development in other jurisdictions.
K E Y W O R D S : oil pollution, ‘Erika’, ‘Prestige’, Polluter-Pays Principle, liability,
environmental damage
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Environmental principles have been heralded as bringing much to environmental law
and this has been well-discussed elsewhere.1 Likewise, there is rich literature sur-
rounding the Polluter-Pays Principle (PPP) and its function in both economic and
legal terms. Some of the literature is referred to briefly for contextual purposes at
relevant points in the discussion that follows. However, regardless of any conclusions
on the debate over the normative function of the PPP (or, indeed, of environmental
principles more broadly), as Scotford points out, these principles are developing in
individual jurisdictions and often in different directions.2 This article focuses upon
how the PPP has developed in a sub-set of international law along with specific juris-
dictions affected by oil pollution incidents. It recognises the tensions that flow from
the interaction between different manifestations of the principle and the potential for
* Manchester Metropolitan University (j.adshead@mmu.ac.uk).
1 Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Hart Publishing 2017)
37–50, provides an excellent account of the ways in which environmental principles interact with environ-
mental law with comprehensive reference to the literature.
2 ibid 4, 5, 263.
Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 18 EEELR 289, 293. The crucial role of the judiciary
in this respect was noted by Klaus Toepfer, ‘UNEP Global Judges Programme’ (2005) v <http://wedocs.
unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/8406/-UNEP%20Global%20Judges%20Programme-20053747.
pdf?sequence¼3&isAllowed¼y> accessed 14 June 2018.
6 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edn, OUP
2009) 326. See also, the discussion by Scotford (n 1) 51–65.
its development to be influenced by that interaction. There may not be a single legal 
formulation of the principle at an international level that filters down to state or re-
gional level,3 but what can be seen from this analysis is that the PPP is not develop-
ing in a vacuum in separate jurisdictions and there is the potential for its form to be 
influenced where norms collide.
The first section of the article focuses on the PPP, giving some contextual back-
ground, with brief reference to the wealth of literature on environmental principles 
and the PPP itself. This is followed by some discussion on specific, contested ele-
ments of the principle which play out in the cases to be examined; the nature of li-
ability, identification of the polluter, and the kind of damage to be compensated. 
The second part examines the international regime for civil liability in marine oil pol-
lution accidents. An overview of the features of the regime relevant to the discussion 
is provided along with some detail on its development and the role of private inter-
ests in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on liability. The final section of the 
article concentrates upon the ‘Erika’ and the ‘Prestige’. The individual incidents and 
the subsequent environmental damage along with the complex web of interests 
involved in each of the shipments provide the backdrop. The discussion then turns 
to the case law flowing from these two incidents, which both spans jurisdictions and 
covers a substantial time.4 As noted by Scotford, the courts play a critical role in 
developing environmental law principles and in helping to crystallise their legal po-
tential within discrete legal systems.5 The key cases are considered in this final sec-
tion of the article, concluding with an analysis of the consequence of these cases for 
the development of the PPP.
It has been argued that the PPP cannot find legal form until it has conceptual and 
definitional certainty.6 This analysis demonstrates the impossibility of reaching the 
goal of such certainties. For example, there can be no overarching formula for deter-
mining who is responsible for and should pay for pollution when the circumstances 
surrounding polluting incidents differ so widely. No doubt the principle will continue 
to develop in different directions in separate jurisdictions, but this analysis demon-
strates how that development might be influenced across jurisdictions; horizontally 
and vertically, both ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’.
2 .  E N V I R O N M E N T A L  P R I N C I P L E S
It is not the purpose of this article to consider environmental principles in any broad 
sense. There is no intention to assess their function in environmental law or their
3 ibid.
4 The ‘Erika’ sank in 2000 and the ‘Prestige’ in 2002. The most recent respective judgments were delivered
in 2012 and 2016.
5 Scotford (n 1) 260. See also, Arne Bleeker, ‘Does the Polluter Pay? The Polluter-Pays Principle in the
limitations in a legal context. These questions have been well-addressed elsewhere,7
most recently by Scotford.8 She concludes that environmental principles do not gen-
erally give rise to high level transnational legal norms.9 Having no legal history or
clear conceptual identity, Scotford argues that the context in which such principles
are applied is important. She suggests that emerging legal meaning can be drawn
from the application and development of principles in different legal systems.10 This
article seeks to investigate this proposition within the specific context of the PPP and
liability for marine oil pollution, but also suggests that there is the potential for the
development of principles to be subject to cross-jurisdictional influence when inter-
national, regional and national law interact.
2.1 The PPP
As with environmental principles generally, there is a great wealth of literature on
both the economic and legal form of the PPP.11 The PPP can be traced back in his-
tory to Plato,12 but its more modern incarnation has its roots in economic theory,
specifically Pigou’s proposition that external costs (or externalities) should be intern-
alised. If such costs are hidden, then the market becomes distorted and inefficient
economic choices will be made.13 In environmental terms, this economic rule
requires the polluter to absorb external costs flowing from his/her polluting
7 There is extensive literature. For example: Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political
Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002); Richard Macrory, Ian Havercroft and Ray Purdy (eds), Principles of
European Environmental Law (Europa Law Publishing 2004); Maurice Sheridan and Luc Lavrysen (eds),
Environmental Law Principles in Practice (Bruylant 2002); Michael Doherty, ‘Hard Cases and
Environmental Principles: An Aid to Interpretation?’ (2004) 3 YEEL 57; Gerd Winter, ‘The Legal Nature
of Environmental Principles in International, EC and German Law’ in Richard Macrory, Ian Havercroft
and Ray Purdy (eds), Principles of European Environmental Law (Europa Law Publishing 2004); Stephen
Tromans, ‘High Talk and Low Cunning: Putting Environmental Principles into Legal Practice’ [1995]
JPEL 779; Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange and Eloise Scotford, Environmental Law: Text, Cases and
Materials (OUP 2013) ch 11; Piet Gillhuis, ‘The Consequences of Introducing Environmental Law
Principles in National Law’ in Maurice Sheridan and Luc Lavrysen (eds), Environmental Law Principles in
Practice (Bruylant 2002).
8 Scotford (n 1) ch 2.
9 ibid.
10 ibid 66.
11 For example: Sanford Gaines, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental
Ethos’ (1991) 26 Texas Int’l LJ 463; Martin O’Connor, ‘The Internalization of Environmental Costs:
Implementing the Polluter Pays Principle in the European Union’ (1997) 7 Int J Env Pollut 450; Aviel
Verbruggen, ‘Preparing the Design of Robust Civil Liability Policy Architectures’ (2011) 11 Int Env
Agree 275; Irina Glazyrina, Vasiliy Glazyrine and Sergey Vinnichenko, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and
Potential Conflicts in Society’ (2006) 59 Ecol Econ 5 324; A Mitchell Polinsky, ‘Strict Liability vs.
Negligence in a Market Setting’ (1980) 70 AER 363; John Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices: An Essay
In Policy-making and Economics (Edward Elgar 2002); Allen Kneese and others, Economics and the
Environment: A Materials Balance Approach (RFF Press 1970); Henri Smets, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle
in the Early 1990s’ in Luigi Campiglio and others (eds), The Environment after Rio: International Law and
Economics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff 1994); Anthony Heyes (ed), The Law and Economics of
the Environment (Edward Elgar 2001).
12 Benjamin Jowett (tr), The Dialogues of Plato: Vol. 4 Laws & Index to Writings of Plato (OUP 1953) book
8, s 485e ‘If anyone intentionally spoils the water of another. . . let him not only pay damages but purify
the stream or cistern which contains the water.’
13 Arthur Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (2nd edn, Macmillan 1924). The Pigovian theory was subsequent-
ly criticised, not least by Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 J L Econ 1.
activities. No such costs should be passed on to the state or the public.14 Although
its origins lie in the economic theory of externalities, the PPP has developed to be-
come a key cornerstone of environmental law and policy. Its emergence as a guiding
principle of environmental law has solid European foundations. It was first adopted
in 1972 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).15 However, early formulations of the principle did not require the polluter
to internalise all environmental costs, only those necessary ‘to ensure that the envir-
onment is in an acceptable state’.16 Over time, however, formulations of the PPP 
have moved towards full internalisation of the costs of polluting activities.17
The European Union (EU) has closely followed the OECD in the adoption of 
the PPP. The principle was first articulated in the Environmental Action Programme
of 1973 and procedures for its application were set out in Recommendation
75/436.18 The PPP now appears in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union at Article 191(2), which places an obligation upon the EU institutions to base 
environmental policy upon the PPP. The early framing of the PPP very much
reflected its roots in economic theory. To begin with the OECD and the EU clearly 
saw the principle as a way of preventing distortion of competition, ensuring a level
playing field and attaining a fully functional single market.19 However, as the prin-
ciple developed, it took on redistributive, preventative, and restorative features.20
Rather than merely focusing on trade distortions, the PPP began to be linked with
incentives for environmental improvements.21 Its dissuasive value was recognised,22
along with its role as a complement to the principle of prevention.23 An understand-
ing that the principle could underpin compensatory and restorative actions as well as
funding public authority pollution expenses also evolved over time.24
At an international level, the PPP was incorporated into Agenda 21 and the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development25 in 1992 but these are particularly 
soft formulations, containing no state obligation and being couched in the caveats of
public interest, trade and investment.26 Despite the PPP having been referred to as a
14 de Sadeleer (n 7) 21.
15 OECD, OECD Council Recommendation on Guiding Principles concerning International Aspects of
Environmental Policies C(72) 128 (final), (1972).
16 ibid, Annex A (a) (4) and OECD, OECD Council Recommendation on the Implementation of the
polluter-pays principle C(74) 223 (final), (1974).
17 OECD, OECD Council Recommendation on the Application of the Polluter-pays Principle to Accidental
Pollution C(89) 88 (final), (1989); OECD, OECD Council Recommendation on the Uses of Economic 
Instruments in Environmental Policy C (90) 177 (final), (1991); de Sadeleer (n 7).
18 75/436/Euratom, ECSC, EEC: Council Recommendation of 3 March 1975 regarding cost allocation and
action by public authorities on environmental matters [1975] OJ L194/1.
19 de Sadeleer (n 7) 34; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 6) 92.
20 de Sadeleer (n 7) 35–37.
21 The Third EC Environmental Action Programme (EAP 3) 1982–86.
22 de Sadeleer (n 7) 35–37 .
23 ibid 36.
24 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage [2004] 
OJ L143/56 (The Environmental Liability Directive).
25 Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992) A/
CONF.151/26 (vol l) 12 August 1992, Annex 1, Principle 16 and Agenda 21, paras 2.14 and 30.3.
26 Alan Boyle and David Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Development (OUP 1999) 4.
general principle of international environmental law,27 as most of the binding provi-
sions incorporating the PPP are in relatively recent instruments at a regional level, it
is doubtful whether the principle constitutes a rule of customary international law.28
2.2 Who are the Polluters and What Should They Pay?
Pollution incidents often involve a complex web of actors responsible for damage
and a key question surrounds how the PPP is satisfied in terms of the division of li-
ability between the responsible parties. One solution is to focus liability upon a single
polluter as the person holding overarching responsibility. This certainly simplifies
matters on an administrative level29 and it is this kind of channelling of liability,
which is applied in the international regime for oil pollution liability.
Recommendation 75/436 appears to reflect this approach, requiring the costs of pol-
lution to be met ‘at the point at which the number of economic operators is least
and control is easiest’.30 Joint and several liability, as an option, will often result in
the most solvent of the responsible parties meeting the bulk of the cost.31 This ‘deep
pocket’ approach has more recently been criticised by the EU Commission as relying
upon the party with the greatest financial resources rather than that which caused
the greatest amount of damage.32 Allocation of financial responsibility raises a real di-
lemma in the application of the PPP. The channelling of liability will often result in
someone other than the polluter paying. For example, in marine pollution cases, the
shipowner is liable regardless of fault, which might lie with the charterer or the cargo
owner. Likewise, a disproportionate level of liability may be met by one of a number
of polluters under a system of joint and several liability. In a perfect world, each re-
sponsible party would meet the full costs of their contribution to the polluting inci-
dent but determining such a contribution in the first place and recovering from each
liable party in the second are both fraught with difficulties. Is it preferable, in terms
of the PPP, that at least most of the costs are met and the victims compensated ac-
cordingly or that a large part of the damage goes unaddressed? The latter outcome
falls yet further away from meeting the full internalisation of costs ideal and nor will
it yield the optimum results for repairing environmental damage.
The discussion so far has centred upon actors directly involved in the pollution
incident but what of those responsible by virtue of their activities at an industry level?
This is a particularly pertinent question in the case of the international oil pollution
regime where the secondary level of compensation derives from oil producers.
The PPP, as discussed above, would seem to indicate that there is no place for re-
sponsibility outside of the individuals or state directly involved in the incident.
However, in the case of global activities, which threaten shared environmental
resources such as climate and the marine environment, should the polluter be
27 Protocol on Preparedness, Response, and Co-Operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and
Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS Protocol, IMO, London) adopted 15 March 2000.
28 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (4th edn, CUP 2018)
240; Philippe Sands, Principles of International Law (Manchester UP 1995) 213.
29 de Sadeleer (n 7) 41.
30 See n 18, Annex, art 3.
31 de Sadeleer (n 7) 53.
32 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Environmental Liability’ (2000) COM (2000) 66 final.
Resources: integration, demand management and protection of groundwaters, C(89) 12 (final) (1989);
OECD, OECD Council Recommendation of 31 March 1991 Concerning the Use of Economic
Instruments in Environmental Policy, C(90) 177 (final) (1991); OECD, OECD Council
Recommendation of 23 July 1992 on the Integrated Management of Coastal Zones, C(92) 114 (final)
(1992).
35 de Sadeleer (n 7) 42.
36 ibid.
37 Verursacherprinzip and principe de causalite respectively. The principle is enshrined in art 1382 of the
French Civil code and an example in German Law can be found in art 8 of the Federal Nature Protection
Act/Bundesnaturschautzgesetz (BNSchG).
38 John Pezzey, ‘Market Mechanisms of Pollution Control: ‘“Polluter-pays”, Economic and Practical
Aspects’ in R Kerry Turner (ed), Sustainable Environmental Management: Principles and Practice
(Westview 1988) 190.
39 Peter Wetterstein, ‘Trends in Maritime Environmental Impairment Liability’ [1994] LMCLQ 230;
Louise de La Fayette, ‘New Approaches for Addressing Damage to the Marine Environment’ (2005) 20
IJMCL 167.
conceptualised at a more global level? For example, in the case of oil pollution inci-
dents, should the world’s major oil companies have some overarching responsibility?
There is surely a compelling argument that undertaking the high-risk activity of 
transporting highly polluting substances by sea brings the oil producers within the 
ambit of ‘polluter’ for the purposes of the principle when oil spills occur. This is par-
ticularly the case when considering the way in which the shipping industry has trad-
itionally operated, using ‘shell’ companies and transporting heavy fuel oils in aged 
and substandard vessels.33
A more radical interpretation of the principle flows from a different conception of 
the polluter. At a time when there is a clear imperative to reduce our reliance upon 
fossil fuels, it can be argued that our individual choices in supporting and sustaining 
the oil industry lay us open to liability when things go wrong and environmental 
damage ensues. Thus, the consumers, whose interests are served by the high-risk 
transportation of oil, can be seen as the root polluters. This is picked up by the 
OECD, in a ‘User Pays Principle’ to complement the PPP.34 The same inherent logic 
of internalisation of external costs applies35 and, furthermore, the ‘User Pays 
Principle’ serves the overarching goal of sustainable development.36 The formula-
tions of the PPP in German and Swiss law,37 which make no specific reference to the 
polluter, align with a broader conceptualisation of the principle. This can be 
expanded yet further to embrace social damages arising from pollution and this has 
been referred to as the ‘Extended Polluter Pays Principle’.38 If the argument for a 
broader conceptualisation of the PPP is accepted, then states picking up residual re-
sponsibility for damage, which is then passed on to the tax payer sits more comfort-
ably with the principle.
The PPP is silent on what constitutes damage and it is here that one of the con-
tentious issues around the principle arises. The debate surrounds the question of 
whether the polluter should pay for pure environmental damage.39 Pure environmen-
tal damage or environmental damage per se is that to which no direct financial cost 
accrues to an individual or state and this may include compensation for lost natural
33 Jose Juste-Ruiz, ‘Compensation for Pollution Damage Caused by Oil Tanker Accidents: From “Erika” to
“Prestige”’ (2010) 1 Agean RL Sea 38.
34 OECD, OECD Council Recommendation of 31 March 1989 Concerning the Management of Aquatic
resources. Damage of this sort does not fit easily within the traditional legal frame-
work for liability as the ‘victim’ is the environment and there is, therefore, no individ-
ual to compensate.40 Furthermore, there are self-evident problems in putting a value
on pure environmental damage, particularly when an environment or species is elimi-
nated and is irreplaceable. In such cases consideration and calculation of intrinsic
value is necessary. Even if such a valuation is possible, questions surround who
should be the recipient of damages in such cases. However, if reparation is not made
for degradation and loss of environment, then the spirit of the PPP is not met, nor
are costs fully internalised. There has been some shift towards recognising pure en-
vironmental damage in the EU.41 Nonetheless, other than in the USA,42 liability for
environmental damage per se is not widely embraced and there are few provisions at
an international level that recognise the concept.43
2.3 Strict Liability under the PPP
A related debate surrounds whether liability in application of the principle should be
strict. If one accepts the narrower formulation of the PPP and that only the person
or entity responsible for the pollution should pay, then there is an argument flowing
from this that only an operator who is at fault in terms of the polluting incident
should be liable. Following this argument, in the example of an oil pollution incident,
a shipowner would only be liable if responsible for the root cause of the accident.
If the accident was caused, eg by the charterer, then they would be liable.44
However, proving fault is notoriously difficult and time consuming and may lead to
problems in allocation of liability and hence inadequate compensation for damage
and a subsequent failure to internalise costs. Also, there is an argument that opera-
tors engaged in high-risk activity should bear the risk of liability regardless of fault.
Certainly, there are a good number of environmental damage regimes, which support
and apply strict liability.45 Taking a broader perspective of the principle and looking
to its essence of passing the whole cost of the damage to those who are responsible
for it, a strict liability regime is more likely to achieve that end.46
The foregoing discussion exposes some of the ambiguities surrounding the PPP.
The principle has evolved over time towards full internalisation of pollution costs,
but who the polluter is and what kind of damage should be compensated remain
contested. The international compensation regime for marine oil pollution examined
below takes its own particular approach to these elements of the PPP.
40 de Sadeleer (n 7) 52.
41 Environmental Liability Directive (n 24).
42 Oil Pollution Act, 1990 33 USC § 2701ff.
43 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (regime for deep sea-bed mining) (1982) pt X1 and Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991).
44 The international regime imposes strict liability upon the shipowner, in the first instance.
45 Including the international oil pollution liability conventions as well as the Convention on Civil Liability
for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, Council of Europe, European
Treaty Series—No 150, Lugano.21.VI.1993 and the Environmental Liability Directive (n 24).
46 de Sadeleer (n 7) 52.
Pollution Damage, 1969, London 27/11/92, UNTS vol 1956, entered into force 30 May 1996 and
UNTC 17146 Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage 1971, London 27/11/92, UNTS vol
1953, entered into force 30 May 1996.
53 Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, London 16/5/03, entered into force 3 March 2005.
54 The amendments raised the total amount of compensation payable in a single incident to around 110 mil-
lion euros.
55 The Civil Liability Convention (n 47) art I(6); The Fund Convention (n 48) art 1(2).
56 IOPC Fund, International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds Claims Manual, October 2016 edn,
para 1.4.
3 .  T H E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  L E G A L  F R A M E W O R K
In examining the international regime, it is worth remembering that it was aimed at 
providing timely compensation for the victims of oil pollution, not at punishment or 
prevention, nor with a view to ensuring that the responsible parties were to pay the 
cost of pollution. Also, as noted previously, the PPP is not an accepted principle of 
international law and consequently lack of explicit reference to the principle in the 
international regime comes as no surprise. The International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) adopted two separate instruments in 196947 and 1971.48 The 1969 Civil 
Liability Convention (CLC) places strict liability on tanker-owners, but liability is 
limited according to vessel size, unless the damage is the result of a personal act or 
omission of the shipowner with the intent to cause damage or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result.49 The 1971 supplementary 
scheme allows for additional compensation for the victims of oil pollution, which is 
financed by the oil industry. Thus, if the cost of damage exceeds the limits of liability 
of the tanker-owner, claims can be made against the fund. Liability is also limited 
under the 1971 Convention50 and the channelling of liability onto the shipowner can 
only be circumvented under the same conditions.51
The original treaties were amended in 1992 and limits of liability were substantial-
ly increased for both tanker-owners and oil interests.52 In response to the demise of 
the vessel ‘Erika’ in 2000, the IMO adopted further amendments to the treaties, 
which once again raised the limits of liability and compensation.53 However, these 
were not yet in force at the time of the sinking of the ‘Prestige’ in 2002.54 The overall 
balance in terms of share of liability was, however, retained. The Civil Liability 
Convention, Fund Convention and the Supplementary Fund all provide compensa-
tion for ‘pollution damage’.55 This is further qualified by the International 
Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund Claims Manual, which makes clear that 
loss of property and economic loss are covered, but limits reinstatement to ‘reason-
able measures’ (a term that is not defined).56 The IOPC fund have made clear that
47 UNTC 14097 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, 29/11/
1969, UNTS vol 973 p 3, entered into force 19 June 1975 (the Civil Liability Convention).
48 UNTC 17146 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, 19/12/1971, UNTS vol 1110 p 57, entered into force 
16 October 1978 (The Fund Convention).
49 The Civil Liability Convention (n 47) art V(1).
50 The Fund Convention (n 48) art 4(4)(a).
51 The Civil Liability Convention (n 47) art III(4).
52 UNTC 14097 Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
‘pollution damage’ does not encompass pure environmental damage,57 leaving a situ-
ation whereby it is a more favourable result in terms of liability to have complete de-
struction of an environmental feature rather than damage that can be rectified.
3.1 The Influence of Shipping and Oil Interests in the International Regime
The features of the international regime examined above were shaped by powerful
shipping and oil interests. After the demise of the ‘Torrey Canyon’ in 1967, the need
for action to compensate for damage caused by oil pollution was clear, but at the
same time industry players sought to protect their own interests in the global oil
trade. The diplomatic conferences that preceded the drafting of the 1969 and 1971
Conventions were attended by representatives of both the shipping and oil industries
and their contributions to the negotiations had a significant impact upon the form of
the final instruments.58 In addition, to pre-empt any action by individual states,
which might be detrimental to their interests, tanker owners entered into a voluntary
agreement to reimburse the cost of clean-up incurred up to a maximum liability
limit.59 This agreement was clearly also intended to influence negotiations on an
intergovernmental instrument and, indeed, TOVALOP had many similar features to
the subsequently adopted CLC.60 In fact, it fulfilled the purpose of compensation for
oil pollution damage until the CLC came into force in 1975.61 Similarly, the
Contract Regarding an Interim Settlement of Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution
(CRISTAL) was intended to influence negotiations at the 1971 diplomatic confer-
ence.62 CRISTAL was a supplementary fund financed by the oil companies for com-
pensation over and above the liability limits set in TOVALOP. The similarity with
the subsequent Fund Convention63 is clear and this supplementary fund provided an
additional source of compensation until it came into force in 1978.
Shipping and oil interests continue to play a significant role in the international
regime and to influence its direction, particularly with regards to the nature of liabil-
ity for pollution damage. International non-governmental organisations (NGO)
(including business associations) have consultative or observer status at fund meet-
ings and participate in inter-governmental discussions. NGOs do not have a right to
vote in these assemblies but voting rarely takes place and their influence is significant
in decisions on policy and law.64 It is also the case that many decisions on shipping
regulation are made according to global share of shipping owned by states. The six
countries that register half of the world’s shipping volume include Panama, Liberia,
57 IOPC Fund Assembly Resolution No 3 of 10 October 1980 (FUND/A/ES. 1/13, para 11.a and Annex I)
formalised in the 1984 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention, art 2.3.
58 Michael M’Gonigle and Mark Zacher, Pollution, Politics and International Law (University of California
Press 1979); Alan Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution (CUP 2006); James Harrison, ‘Regime Pluralism
and the Global Regulation of Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation’ (2009) 5 Int JL Context 379,
385.
59 Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP).
60 The Civil Liability Convention (n 47).
61 Harrison (n 58).
62 IMO Conference on the Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution
Damage, 29 November–18 December 1971 (LEG/CONF.2); ibid.
63 The Fund Convention (n 48).
64 Harrison (n 58) 384.
Sanctions, Including Criminal Sanctions for Pollution Offences (2003) COM(2003)92 final, Explanatory
Memorandum, para 2.2.
69 The Fund Convention (n 48).
70 For example, provision for preventative and compensatory measures.
71 The Civil Liability Convention (n 47) art III(1).
Malta and the Bahamas65; the main ‘flag of convenience’ providers who will clearly 
exert a disproportional influence upon such decisions. Private interests have also con-
tinued to operate out-with the international regime where they have been unable to 
influence its amendment.66 STOPIA and TOPIA have the effect of significantly rais-
ing the liability of tanker owners and, therefore, reducing the burden upon the oil in-
dustry.67 Both are contractual agreements enforceable under English law, but, 
judging by past developments, they are likely to have a significant impact upon the 
inter-governmental regime for oil pollution liability and compensation.
Given the significant influence of oil and shipping interests explored above, it is 
perhaps no surprise that the international regimes set clear limits on the sums of 
compensation available and provide, in the first instance, for sole responsibility with 
the ship owner under the CLC. The big shipping organisations are then protected by 
the dispersal of liability through ‘one ship companies’. Despite consistent calls for 
limits on compensation to be abolished,68 although increased in 2003,69 they have 
not been significantly raised and remain intact. The powerful international oil and 
shipping interests accepted potential liability on their own terms to be able to con-
tinue to ship oil around the globe and their continued influence over the shape of 
the international regime has determined the nature of that liability and the way in 
which it reflects the PPP.
3.2 The International Regime and the PPP
In examining the role of the PPP in the international regime for oil pollution com-
pensation, it is important to be cognisant of the context and timing of the regime’s 
inception. Its development followed swiftly on the heels of the ‘Torrey Canyon’ dis-
aster in 1967 long before the first articulation of the PPP from the OECD. This was 
a time when environmental policy and law were in their infancy and many of the fea-
tures of the regime were innovative and ahead of their time.70 The dangers involved 
in transporting persistent heavy fuel oils around the globe by sea and the devastating 
long-term environmental consequences of oil spillage were, however, clearly issues to 
contend with and the international regime set out to do this by introducing a swift 
mechanism to compensate for damage caused by oil pollution. The task was not an 
insubstantial one. International agreement across nations with varying degrees of 
interest in shipping, oil and the marine environmental was needed and this, alongside 
accommodating the powerful shipping and oil interests discussed above.
The channelling of liability on the shipowner, in the first instance,71 under the 
international regime clearly does not meet the demands of the PPP. In all but the
65 Friends of the Earth, ‘Prestige Oil Spill—Who Foots the Bill?’ (November 2002) 1. The others being
Cyprus and China.
66 Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement (STOPIA) 2006, art IV(c) (1); Tanker Oil
Pollution Indemnification Agreement (TOPIA) 2006, art XVI(c); Harrison (n 58) 387.
67 STOPIA, art IV(c) (1); TOPIA, art XVI(c).
68 For example, in the Proposal for a Directive on Ship-source Pollution and on the Introduction of
most serious marine oil pollution incidents, the shipowner will be liable for the full
extent of the damage, regardless of the contribution of other parties to the pollution.
The Fund Convention does provide for an element of shared responsibility72 and, in
terms of application of the PPP, this means that, at least in the more serious cases of
oil pollution damage, the owners of the ship and the owners of the cargo are both
treated as polluters and share the cost of pollution damage.73 However, the contribu-
tion of oil receivers to the fund and to any subsequent pay-out is irrespective of dir-
ect responsibility for the pollution74 and this kind of insurance-like arrangement
does not accord with the PPP. Furthermore, there is no forensic analysis of responsi-
bility and the allocation of liability and the activation of the secondary layer of com-
pensation are based purely on pre-prescribed formulae.75 Costs of damage falling
outside the Conventions were traditionally borne by the victims of the pollution,
which appears to run counter to the PPP. However, this does align with the ‘user
pays principle’ if authorities contribute to the cost of serious pollution incidents and
pass part of the burden on to the ultimate beneficiaries of oil use—the public. This
kind of distribution under the PPP is not without difficulties, not least in distinguish-
ing between categories of oil users within the public.76 Nonetheless, some sort of
overarching responsibility on the part of national authorities on behalf of those who
all use or benefit from oil in some form or other is not unthinkable.
The international regime adopts a strict liability approach, which accords with the
tradition in maritime law77 and is the preferred model of liability under the PPP.
The use of strict liability ensures that those engaged in hazardous activities bear re-
sponsibility for any pollution that results regardless of whether fault can be shown
and can thus ensure optimum internalisation of costs. However, the international re-
gime has been subject to criticism for its failure to allow compensation for pure en-
vironmental damage along with the limits of ‘reasonable’ re-instatement.78 There is
no definition in the CLC79 or the Fund Convention80 of ‘reasonable’ in this context
and this limitation is worrying in terms of the application of the PPP. The term ‘rea-
sonable’ brings with it clear connotations of economic considerations and limiting
compensation in this way runs counter to the goal of optimising cost internalisation.
The IOPC Fund Assembly has been consistent in its position on restricting compen-
sation to cover the costs of measures ‘actually undertaken’ or to be undertaken and
in its resistance to any valuation of environmental loss.81 The lack of compensation
72 Harrison (n 58) 380.
73 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 6) 436.
74 The Fund Convention (n 48).
75 The Civil Liability Convention (n 47); The Fund Convention (n 48).
76 Bleeker (n 5) 298.
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64.
78 See eg The European Commission, Erika I package, COM (2000) 142 final, 34–35; Michael Mason,
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for a damaged feature of the marine environment that does not hold the capacity for 
restoration certainly leaves a stark hole in any assessment of the international regime 
for compliance with the PPP. However, whilst a few states have for some time 
embraced compensation for environmental damage per se along with valuation 
models,82 it is not until quite recently that this practice has been adopted under the 
PPP, in the EU, for example.83 It is also common for the degree of restoration in 
other areas of environmental law, where the PPP is applied to be limited by econom-
ic factors and/or the principle of proportionality84 to what is ‘reasonable’.
As noted at the beginning of this section, the international regime was not 
designed with the PPP in mind and the principle itself, although it has been 
referred to as a general principle of international law,85 probably does not have 
customary law status. Furthermore, where the PPP appears in international instru-
ments, it is couched in the softest terms and the need to balance the principle with 
financial and trade interests is explicitly recognised.86 That said, the international 
regime clearly does incorporate features of the extended PPP. It adopts a strict li-
ability approach and elements of the ‘user pays principle’ can be recognised in the 
arrangements for sharing responsibility and passing some of this onto the general 
public. Importantly where the international regime interacts with national and 
regional law it opens the doors to cross-fertilisation and development of the 
PPP  and this is well illustrated  in the ‘Erika’ and ‘Prestige’ pollution incidents 
discussed below.
4 .  T H E  T A L E S  O F  T H E  ‘ E R I K A ’  A N D  T H E  ‘ P R E S T I G E ’
Certain significant maritime disasters have shaped the direction of the law on liabil-
ity for accidental oil pollution. The ‘Torrey Canyon’ disaster mentioned above was 
followed by the sinking of the ‘Exxon Valdez’ off the coast of Alaska in 1989. The 
release of huge quantities of oil from the vessel with disastrous consequences to an 
environmentally sensitive area led the USA to take a separate direction in liability 
for accidental oil pollution damage.87 Other notable incidents followed, such as the 
demise of the ‘Braer’ off the coast of Scotland in 1993.88 However, until the ‘Erika’ 
and ‘Prestige’ disasters, the international regime had sufficient funds to compensate 
for the pollution damage caused within the ambit of the Conventions. The conse-
quential damage suffered following the ‘Erika’ and ‘Prestige’ disasters was to prove 
a challenge to the international regime in terms of cost as well as in determining 
liability.
82 For example, US Oil Pollution Act (n 42).
83 The Environmental Liability Directive (n 24).
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4.1 The ‘Erika’
The ‘Erika’ was a single-hulled vessel of nearly 25 years of age and was practically the
only asset of the owning company. Prior to the voyage in question, she had changed
hands and name seven times and had previously suffered damage.89 Her ownership
is a classic case of complexity and the use of shell-companies and would lead to sub-
sequent problems in determining liability. Total Transport Company (France) had
chartered the ‘Erika’ to transport heavy fuel oil from Dunkerque in France to
Milazzo in Italy. She was carrying 31,000 tonnes of one of the most polluting hydro-
carbons with one of the lowest economic values when she left Dunkerque on
8 December 1999. After encountering heavy swells and developing a severe list, the
tanker ultimately broke in two in the Bay of Biscay some 45 nautical miles off the
coast of Brittany during the night of 13th December.90 19,800 tonnes of the ‘Erika’s’
cargo of heavy fuel oil was spilled, polluting 400 km of the French coastline in the
worst ever environmental disaster in France.91 As a result of the oil pollution, and
despite a massive clean-up exercise, thousands of seabirds wintering on the French
coast were killed.
4.2 The ‘Erika’ Cases
4.2.1 Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v Total France SA
Following the ‘Erika’ disaster, the Commune de Mesquer, an area badly affected by
the subsequent effects of oil pollution, brought proceedings against Total France SA
and Total International Ltd (Total) for the reimbursement of its clean-up costs over
and above the compensation already received from the IOPC Fund. Due to the
channelling of liability upon the shipowner, in the first instance, and limits on liability
under the international regime, Total’s liability for compensation was limited. The
action in the French courts against Total was brought under EU waste law, which
did not provide for any limits to liability. As a previous holder of the ‘waste’, Total
could be strictly liable for the cost of all of the damage.92 The action to recover the
extra clean-up costs was unsuccessful at first instance93 and, on appeal, the first in-
stance judgment was confirmed.94 The Municipality then appealed on a point of law
to the Cour de Cassation on the basis that this resulted in a problem with the inter-
pretation of Directive 75/442/EEC on waste.95 The Cour de Cassation referred
three questions by way of preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the EU.
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(2008) 33 Tulane Marit LJ 41, 44.
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2006 on Waste [2006] OJ L114/9, art 15.
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259–81 (2001).
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International Ltd, 13 February 2002, JurisData no 2002-204764; Environnement 51ff (2002).
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Following the principles established in the Van der Walle case,96 the Court of 
Justice found that once the hydrocarbons, which had been accidentally spilled, were 
mixed with sediment they constituted waste for the purpose of the Directive.97 The 
Court of Justice also addressed the question of the conflict between EU and inter-
national regimes. The EU is not a party to the inter-governmental regimes, whereas 
most of its Member States, including France, are parties to the Conventions. Whilst 
acknowledging the right of Member States to adopt the limitations on liability 
imposed under international law, the court saw no problem with a secondary layer of 
EU liability.98 Thus, it found no conflict between the two sets of obligations at EU 
and international level and held that national law was to ensure that any further costs 
incurred outside the limits of international law were ‘borne by the producer of the 
product from which the waste thus spread came’.99 Although de Sadeleer suggests 
that the Court’s reasoning is ‘convincing and sound’,100 the international regime 
clearly and unequivocally dictates that no additional claims can be made outside its 
remit101 and the European Commission had previously acceded that ‘this means that 
it would be very difficult for the Community to impose additional individual liabil-
ities on ship owners or any of the protected parties without being in conflict with the 
international conventions’.102 The arguments surrounding the EU’s subsequent ex-
plicit authorisation for Member States to accede to the 2003 Protocol to the inter-
national regime were dismissed by Advocate General Kokott as this post-dated the 
accident.103 Yet, this instruction to Member States does point to a clear steer from 
the EU, which is underlined by the fact that accidental oil pollution incidents covered 
by the international regime were explicitly excluded from the Environmental 
Liability Directive passed just 2 years after the ‘Erika’ disaster.104
The Court of Justice answered in the affirmative to the question of whether Total 
could be liable for the costs of disposal as a prior holder and contributor to the causal 
chain that created the waste, again applying principles derived from Van der 
Walle.105 The Court used its interpretive powers to effectively extend the reach of 
the PPP by concluding that the seller of the oil and the charterer of the vessel had 
‘produced’ the waste by contributing to the risk that the pollution caused by the ship-
wreck would occur.106 They had so done by failing to take measures to prevent the 
accident. Thus, the Court further concluded that the seller and the vessel’s charterer 
were both ‘previous holders’ of the waste for the purposes of Article 15 of the Waste 
Framework Directive.107 This was despite the opinion of Advocate General Kokott,
who argued that the passing on of a great part of environmental liability to the public
under the international regimes accorded with the PPP.108
4.2.2 Cour de Cassation Judgment of 25 September 2012
Whereas the Commune de Mesquer case above concerned the liability of Total, the
Cour de Cassation judgment followed an appeal against a decision of the Court of
Appeal on criminal liability in Paris in 2010.109 In the Court of Appeal, the ship-
owner, the management company, the classification society and Total SA were all
found criminally liable for the offence of causing pollution. The Court also consid-
ered civil liability and determined that all parties, apart from Total SA, were also li-
able in civil law. In the Cour de Cassation, one of Total’s arguments was that the
criminal conviction ran counter to the international conventions, which channel li-
ability on ship owners rather than charterers.
The Cour de Cassation upheld the decision that Mr. Savarese (the President of
the owning company, Tevere Shipping) was the agent of the owner and thus fell
within the channelling provisions of Article III(4) of the CLC.110 However, the court
determined that his liability could not be excluded in the light of his recklessness.
Mr. Savarese had consented to a request from Mr Pollara that work carried out by a
shipyard in Montenegro in 1998 on the ‘Erika’ was performed to a minimum and in-
sufficient standard at a significantly reduced cost. He had also chartered the ‘Erika’
when he knew that she was in a dilapidated condition due to inadequate mainten-
ance and in risk of accident and sinking. The Court concluded that Mr Pollara was
the agent of the company performing services for the ship (Panship Management)
and, therefore, fell within the channelling provisions of Article III(4), but was like-
wise not excluded from liability because of his reckless actions. As well as deciding to
make the minimum repairs, he was the first person informed of the ship’s difficulties
and the spillage of oil and yet had not informed the coastal authorities.
The Court, also determined that the Court of Appeal had erred in concluding
that a classification society could not benefit from the channelling provisions.111
Article III(4) excludes ‘any other person who, without being a member of the crew,
performs services for the ship’. The Court of Appeal had determined that classifica-
tion societies, although paid by the shipowner, were exercising public powers in the
interest of the public and, as such, did not fall within the ambit of the exclusion. The
Cour de Cassation rejected this reading of the Convention, but also found the classi-
fication society (RINA) to have acted recklessly.112 This was based upon the ship
having been certified to sail even though a summary inspection had shown an
advanced state of corrosion following recent repair.
Reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Cour de Cassation imposed civil
liability under French law on Total SA. Again, as the damage also resulted from the
recklessness of the charterer, the court determined neither could Total rely upon the
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Care, 26 January 2016) <http://coastalcare.org/2016/01/spain-court-finds-captain-british-insurer-li
able-for-prestige-oil-spill/> accessed 23 June 2018.
limitations imposed by the international regime. The Court of Appeal had concluded 
that Total, as the ‘time charterer’ of the ship, clearly fell within the list of beneficiaries 
of the exoneration provided under Article III.4. They found that, although negligent in 
not having adhered to the oil company’s in-house vetting procedure, it was unlikely 
that Total were aware that the ship had deteriorated sufficiently to be at risk of sinking 
and impossible to charter.113 The Cour de Cassation, however, concluded that Total 
was liable as it had acted recklessly within the meaning of Article III(4). There is little 
elaboration upon this conclusion, the court simply asserting that Total’s representative, 
in not insisting upon a new vetting of the ‘Erika’, was ‘necessarily aware of the damage 
by pollution that would probably follow’.114
The Court of Appeal had broken new ground in terms of the PPP by recognising 
pure environmental damage as a head of compensation115 and the Cour de 
Cassation reinforced this recognition and defined such damage as ‘direct or indirect 
damage inflicted on the environment and resulting from the infringement’.116 Thus, 
damages were awarded in French law under three heads: (1) economic losses (2) 
moral prejudice and (3) environmental harm.
4.3 The ‘Prestige’
Just 3 years after the ‘Erika’ went down off the coast of Brittany, the ‘Prestige’ sank 
off the Galician coast, causing severe environmental damage to coastal areas of 
Spain, France and Portugal. The ‘Prestige’ was a 26 year-old single hulled oil tanker, 
constructed in Japan, registered in the Bahamas and flying a Bahamian flag.117 As 
with the ‘Erika’ the ownership of the ‘Prestige’ was complex, involving a network of 
front companies and the identity of the true owner remains unknown.118 The vessel 
was carrying around 77,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil when, on 13 November 2002, 
she encountered a storm off the Galician coast in North West Spain. She developed 
a severe list and drifted towards the coast. One of the vessel’s 12 oil tanks burst and 
the captain called upon Spain for help. Rather than allowing the tanker into harbour, 
the local authority instructed the captain to steer away from the coast. The ‘Prestige’ 
finally broke in half on the morning of 19th November and sank later that day 
around 250 km from the Spanish coast. More of the vessel’s cargo of heavy fuel oil 
entered the ocean and she continued to leak oil at the rate of approximately 125 
tonnes per day. In total around 63,000 tonnes of her oil cargo were spilled. The spill 
polluted 2980 km of coastline and over 1000 beaches of Spain, France and Portugal. 
It was the single largest environmental disaster in the history of both Spain and 
Portugal with an estimated cost of over 4 billion Euros.119 The effects were
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particularly notable in the territory of Galicia in Spain, where an important ecological
region sustained significant damage and offshore fishing was suspended for
6 months.120
4.4 The ‘Prestige’ Cases
4.4.1 New York Court of Appeal Judgment, August 2012
The legal situation with regards to the classification society in the ‘Prestige’ incident
was different to the ‘Erika’ because the ‘Prestige’ was classed by a US society, the
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). The USA is not a party to any of the inter-
national conventions, so the protection under such arrangements did not apply.
Spain appealed against a decision that ABS were exempt from liability121 on the basis
that they should not fall outside of the group of potentially liable parties because
their conduct was reckless. The District Court did not provide an answer on whether
US classification societies can be liable in tort in the US courts but decided the case
purely on the question of ‘recklessness’. They determined that there had been no
recklessness on the part of ABS and, therefore the position with regards to the liabil-
ity of non-party state classification societies remains in doubt. It is interesting, par-
ticularly in comparison to the Cour de Cassation case explored above, that the court
found no recklessness given a long list of errors on the part of ABS alleged by the
claimant.
4.4.2 Decision of Spain’s Supreme Court, Madrid, 14/1/16
In November 2013, the Galician Region High Court delivered its judgment on crim-
inal proceedings instituted in 2002 against four parties; the Master, Chief Officer and
Chief Engineer of the ‘Prestige’ as well as Mr Lopez-Sors, the Spanish official who
had ordered the vessel to sail away from the coast. Civil claims were added to the
proceedings in 2010 against the owner of the ‘Prestige’ (Mare Shipping Inc.) and
their insurers (London Steamship Owners Mutual Insurance Association Limited).
The court found all parties not guilty of the criminal charges122 and found the insur-
er’s civil liability to be limited to their responsibility under the CLC.123 The decision
was appealed to the Spanish Supreme Court and two judgments of the Spanish
Supreme Court dated 14 January 2016 partly overturned the judgment of the
Provincial Court of La Coruna.
Faced with no criminal offence, the Galician Court had been unable to reach a de-
cision on compensation under civil law. The Supreme Court, however, found that
the master of the vessel was negligent and that his negligence amounted to wilful
misconduct under Article V.3 of the CLC and thus civil liability was unlimited.124
This decision was based primarily on the fact that the master was aware of deficien-
cies and faults with the ‘Prestige’ before she sailed along with the possibility of bad
120 ITOPF, ‘Prestige, Spain/France, 2002’ (ITOPF, 2014) <http://www.itopf.com/in-action/case-studies/
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weather.125 The court found that these factors together with the taking on of further 
cargo had hindered the seaworthiness and manoeuvring ability of the vessel following 
the initial damage to its hull. The court concluded that the master’s seamanship was 
dangerous, saying that ‘he created a serious risk, particularly with regards to the 
highly-polluting nature of the substance he was transporting’.126
In addition, the Supreme Court found the owner and classification society civilly 
liable. The owner was held to be vicariously liable having also acted with wilful mis-
conduct such that there was no limit to liability under the CLC. The court concluded 
that the registered owner must have known of the condition of the vessel. The 
‘Prestige’ had been vetoed by other oil companies127 and was forbidden to sail in sev-
eral countries. A witness attested to the fact that the vessel was intended to be 
scrapped at the port of origin, but a decision had been made to employ her on one 
final voyage. The insurer (The London Club) had already attained a negative de-
claratory judgment from the UK Commercial Court, effectively limiting its liability 
to the insured amount of 22,777,986 Euros under Article 7 of the CLC.128 
Furthermore, the Civil Bench of the Spanish Supreme Court had held in a judgment 
of 3 July 2003 that Spanish courts did not have jurisdiction to entertain a direct claim 
against a P&I Club as such claims are subject to arbitration.129 However, the 
Supreme Court noted that the Club had chosen not to defend itself even though 
summoned and that they had gone beyond the ‘pay to be paid’ rule when they 
deposited the amount insured with the Court. In any event, they were directly re-
sponsible in Spanish law because the civil liability flowed from a criminal offence. 
There was, in fact, additional insurance over and above the amount deposited and 
the Spanish Supreme Court held that the London insurer was responsible for the 
total amount of liability insured.130
On the matter of recovering for pure environmental damage, the civil liability 
established in the judgment covered restoration and reparation of damage. Damages 
were recovered under three heads, material damages, moral damages and environ-
mental damage,131 similarly to the decision on categorisation of damages in the Cour 
de Cassation. Although there was no explicit judicial recognition of environmental 
damage per se by the Supreme Court, they determined that the compensation pay-
able by the fund could not exclude damages that did not exactly match those eligible 
for compensation under the Fund Convention and, furthermore that the IOPC
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Fund Claim Manual was to be used for guidance purposes only. Thus, it seems that
the door is also opened for compensation for pure environmental damage in Spain.
5 . A P P L I C A T I O N O F T H E P P P I N T H E C O U R T S
Following the summary above, this section turns to consider how the PPP was
applied by the courts in these cases. The Commune de Mesquer case was the latest of
a line of cases132 before the Court of Justice where the court has developed the PPP
in a doctrinal way by using it as an interpretive aid.133 Prior to this case, the position
established by the court was that the PPP only imposes the burden of remedying pol-
lution upon those who have contributed to the polluting incident.134 However, there
is clearly a wide margin of discretion that rests with Member States on application of
the principle in accordance with local conditions.135 The Commune de Mesquer case
extends the principle to embrace those contributing to the risk that pollution is
caused.136 Applying this, the court answered in the affirmative on the question of
whether Total could be the producer and or holder of waste and held that imposing
liability on Total accorded with the PPP. However, it is interesting to note the opin-
ion of Advocate General Kokott in the case. She was of the view that passing on the
additional clean-up costs over and above the limits of the international regime to the
public accorded with the PPP.137 This would have been a way to contain EU juris-
prudence within the bounds of the international regime by adhering to the limits in
the international conventions. At the same time, it would have aligned the outcome
with the ‘user pays principle’ by shifting part of the burden to the general public.
There has been some criticism of the approach taken by the Court of Justice in this
case, not least from those who see a clear distinction between the tradition of mari-
time law and the terrestrial law of the EU.138 However, putting aside issues around
defining waste and the blurring of the distinctions between waste and contaminated
land as well as between waste and marine pollution, there are interesting consequen-
ces for the development of the PPP, which flow from this decision. The much
broader application of the principle by the Court of Justice is no surprise given the
more entrenched position it holds in EU law. However, bringing oil companies who
run the risk of oil pollution incidents into the frame of liability in this way could re-
sult in double application of the principle. The fund and the supplementary fund of
the international regime are financed, in part, by oil companies, including Total. In
the case of the ‘Erika’, the fund had been exhausted to its limit and it can be argued,
therefore, that Total had already made some of its contribution under the PPP.
Whereas the decision of the Court of Justice involved the extension of liability
through a supplementary layer of EU law, the decisions of the Court of Appeal and
the Cour de Cassation in France on the civil liability of key actors in the demise of
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the vessel ‘Erika’ required the application of the international regime in the national 
courts. The exoneration provisions of Art III(4) CLC have traditionally been advan-
tageous to those other than the shipowner who are involved in a polluting incident. 
The very high threshold of fault required for other players to be caught in the liability 
net has previously protected all but the shipowner and led to effective channelling of 
liability. Thus, regardless of who is responsible for the pollution, the shipowner pays 
up to the limit as determined by the CLC. With mandatory insurance, this means 
that the first tranche of responsibility is met by insurers. However, faced with inter-
preting the level of recklessness required to remove other actors from their protected 
position under the international regime, the French courts found multiple contribu-
tors to the ‘Erika’ disaster liable, including, in the Cour de Cassation, the charterer 
and Total SA. No longer, it seems, is it such an advantage to be identified as one of 
the excluded parties under Art III(4). In terms of the application of the PPP, this 
clearly expands the remit of the international regime. Whereas, previously the ship-
owner was strictly liable irrespective of role in the polluting incident, there is now 
the opportunity to bring other players with direct responsibility for pollution into 
the liability pool: Albeit, the level of culpability involved remains high.
Significant in the findings of the French courts is their approach to environmental 
damage under the PPP. As noted, the administrators of the IOPC Funds have been 
consistently clear that compensation under the international regime is not available 
for environmental damage per se. Their position is that such damage is not quantifi-
able in financial terms.139 The recognition of pure environmental damage by both 
the Court of Appeal and the Cour de Cassation in applying the international regime 
is, thus, a controversial move that opens the possibility of an expanded definition of 
pollution damage in the national courts. Interestingly, the Court of Appeal did not 
find liability for pure environmental damage to be at odds with the 1992 CLC, saying 
that the provisions in Article I(6) excluding environmental compensation except in 
cases of reinstatement did not prevent compensation for pure environmental dam-
age.140 Furthermore, in the light of the ‘Erika’ cases and commentary,141 in 2013, a 
working group in France proposed inclusion in the Civil Code of a new responsibil-
ity for pure environmental damage, which came into force in 2016.142 This, leaves 
France, as an individual party to the international conventions, in the position where, 
despite the observation of the Cour de Cassation, French law on compensation for 
environmental damage would appear to be at odds with international law.
Whilst French case law has opened the door for classification societies to pay for 
the cost of pollution, the New York Court of Appeal judgment of 2012 highlights 
some of the potential problems of extending the ambit of the PPP within the inter-
national regime. The decision leaves open the question as to whether classification 
societies (and presumably other operators) based in the USA can be subject to liabil-
ity if the threshold for recklessness is met. This question also remains unanswered
139 See n 57.
140 Rebeyrol (n 89) 39.
141 Giles Martin and Laurent Neyret, Nomennclatre des prejudices environnementaux (LGDJ Collection Droit
des affaires 2012); Corrine Lepage, Rapport Mieux reparer le dommage environnemental (Club des 
Juristes 2012).
142 Title IV, Livre 111 of the Civil Code, arts 1386-19, 20 and 21.
were operators to be based in other non-party states. It also raises the problem of na-
tional courts applying different standards of recklessness across jurisdictions. This
leaves the position whereby, depending upon where the polluting company is regis-
tered and where judgment is made, the polluter may or may not pay.
The decision in the Galician High Court a little over 1 year after the Cour de
Cassation ruling took a very different turn in terms of extending polluter liability be-
yond the vessel owner.143 However, it seems likely that this decision was influenced
by political factors144 and in the Spanish Supreme Court in 2016, not only did the
court find the requisite level of negligence with the master of the vessel, but they
also found the vessel owner to be vicariously liable. Likewise, the court concluded
that the classification society had acted in such a reckless way as to override their
protection from liability. Thus, as in France, there is the possibility of broadened ap-
plication of the PPP under the international regime. The Spanish Supreme Court, to
a degree, also followed the Cour de Cassation in extending the ambit of the principle
to cover environmental damage per se.
As previously noted, the shipowner’s share of liability (if the requisite element of
recklessness is lacking) is limited and subject to compulsory insurance. Faced with
the possibility that the Galician court might find liability for the shipowner in excess
of the limit, the London-based insurers of the vessel had sought to limit their liability
by way of reliance on contractual provisions. Judgments of the Commercial Court
and the Court of Appeal in the UK affirmed the insurers’ limited liability.145 The
sum insured was, in fact, much higher than the CLC limit and the Spanish Supreme
Court held that the insurers were liable up to the total amount insured of 1 Billion
USD.146 If the insurer’s liability is limited, as confirmed by the UK Court of Appeal,
then the shipowner may be exposed to uninsured losses, arguably ensuring fuller ap-
plication of the PPP as payment comes directly from the pocket rather than by virtue
of an insurance premium.
The decisions in the ‘Erika’ and ‘Prestige’ cases are significant in the development
of the legal history of the PPP. Whilst precise definition of the principle remains elu-
sive, certain trajectories of travel can be identified and the influence of legal develop-
ments in other jurisdictions is also apparent. The Court of Justice in the Commune
de Mesquer case was not prepared to accept the restrictions on the PPP imposed by
the international regime. Thus, rather than liability falling upon a single polluter, as
favoured by the OECD Recommendation of 1975, the net was cast wider to capture
another contributor. This approach to the PPP had already been accepted by the
Court of Justice, but here they extended it to include those who contribute to the
risk of an incident. The channelling of liability adopted by the international regime
can indirectly lead to the public paying the price of pollution and thus bring the ‘user
143 Greenpeace, The Guardian (London, 13 November 2013) referred to it as ‘an extraordinary ruling’.
144 El Pais (Paris, 12 November 2013). The current Spanish Prime Minister (Mariano Rajoy), who was
Deputy Prime Minister at the time of the spill, had come under criticism when the local Conservative
Popular Party ordered the vessel out to sea instead of following the emergency plan. He had also con-
sistently down played the seriousness of the incident at the time.
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pays principle’ into play and this was argued although not accepted in the case, high-
lighting the potential for cross-fertilisation in the development of the PPP.
Similarly, the courts in France and Spain rejected the channelling of liability upon 
a single polluter, but in this case by interpreting the level of recklessness required by 
the international regime in such a way as to prevent the exclusion of other parties. 
There is no direct reference to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, but both 
countries are, of course, EU Member States. The national courts were also prepared 
to stray into the territory of compensation for pure environmental damage. 
Arguably, this reflects the true essence of the PPP by internalising all environmental 
costs. This divergence from the position of the international regime may well open 
opportunities for there to be re-consideration of the inclusion of this kind of damage 
within its ambit. Compensation for environmental damage per se certainly reflects 
the approach taken in the USA147 and, more recently, adopted by the EU and 
France. It is possible to identify a trajectory of travel in the history of the PPP from 
these cases and the Commune de Mesquer case towards broader conceptualisation of 
the ‘polluter’ along with a wider framing of environmental damage. This accords 
with the notion that all those responsible for pollution (directly or indirectly) should 
pay to fully internalise environmental costs.
6 .  T H E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  R E G I M E  I N  J E O P A R D Y
The decisions discussed above certainly strike a blow against the protected position 
of shipping and oil companies. There is now a potential antidote to the single com-
pany (often insolvent) ship owner bearing all initial responsibility and the ship char-
terer and the seller can also face strict and unlimited liability. However, these 
developments in the application of the PPP directly threaten the compromise pos-
ition that exists under the international regime, whereby strict liability is accepted 
only on the terms of limiting the exposure of powerful interests to liability. 
Furthermore, the position taken by the Court of Justice with regards to competing 
international obligations for Member States places them in the difficult position of ei-
ther dishonouring their international obligations or breaching EU law148 and thus 
potentially jeopardises the international regime.
The entrenched position of the PPP in European law, vis a vis international law 
may to some degree explain the approach of the Court of Justice and that of the 
courts in France and Spain. However, it is important to consider this in the broader 
context of EU maritime policy. The EU came relatively late to the development of 
an overarching policy for the marine environment.149 However, faced with the devas-
tating consequences to Member States from oil pollution after the ‘Erika’ disaster,
147 US Oil Pollution Act (n 42).
148 Christina Eckes, Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v Total France and Total International Ltd,
the European Commission was quick to propose legislative provisions. Three pack-
ages were put forward, the first only a matter of months after the ‘Erika’ sank.150
The proposals ranged from monitoring maritime traffic, port state control and phas-
ing out single hull tankers amongst others. Controversially, in the second package,151
the Commission proposed an additional compensation fund to supplement that
available under the International Regime.
In its Communication of 21 March 2000, the Commission expressed its view that
the maximum level of compensation under the international regime was not suffi-
ciently high to ensure that it met all potential claims resulting from an oil pollution
incident. The Commission was also of the view that the system of channelling re-
sponsibility and limits based on a very high level of fault did not provide a disincen-
tive for the carriage of oil in sub-standard vessels.152 As it happens, the European
COPE Fund never actually came into being as the IMO created the Supplementary
Fund in 2003,153 which increased the maximum limit of liability to 750 million
SDRs.154 However, despite consistent EU criticism of channelling limits and the
strict liability regime, the international regime remains in essentially the same form
today.
Whilst the Commission’s criticism of the international regime clearly encom-
passes a desire to apply the PPP, particularly in its call for a raising of the maximum
compensation limit to cover all claims,155 it must be remembered that there is resist-
ance to change at a very fundamental level inherent in the international regime.
The dominance of powerful oil and shipping interests is clearly a factor, which has
previously been alluded to. Also, the organic mechanisms for change have traditional-
ly flowed from industry initiatives in the first instance.156 Indeed, it has been sug-
gested that the shipping industry and especially the key flag states, are not readily
influenced by regional and more recent players in the field of shipping regulation.157
International shipping law is certainly grounded in conservatism and traditional pat-
terns and a key feature of this is the close link in maritime law between strict liability
and an accompanying limitation of exposure to liability.158 Indeed, Somers and
Gonsaeles warn against the imposition of terrestrial environmental law to the inter-
national regime.159 They argue that legal solutions for land-based activities (such as
waste) are not appropriate for the global marine environment and that only
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international measures grounded in traditional maritime law should be applied in 
this particular legal arena.160
It is perhaps no surprise then that the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) 
reacted in a strongly critical way to the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court in 
the ‘Prestige’ case. The ICS specifically points out that limits on liability are the es-
sential quid pro quo for shipowners agreeing a strict liability regime under the 
CLC161 and furthermore, that the agreed system of shared liability could be seriously 
undermined by the decision.162 This view echoes concerns in respect of the earlier 
Court of Justice ruling in the Commune de Mesquer case that the decision subverts 
the international system and may lead to its erosion and collapse in the future.163
Changes to the international regime have been considered and an intersessional 
Working Group was set up by the 1992 Fund Assembly in April 2000 to assess the 
adequacy of the international compensation system. The group reported in 2004.164 
It was this group that was responsible for the drafting of a Protocol to establish the 
third tier of compensation. The group also considered environmental damage and 
revised the text of the Claims Manual to clarify the definition of ‘pollution damage’ 
and its exclusion of environmental damage per se.165 In its work, there was no sub-
stantive consideration given to the basic principles of limited liability or the channel-
ling of liability, raised by the European Commission in 2000 and fundamental to the 
application of the PPP.166
Concerns were raised with the 1992 Fund Executive Committee following the 
judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court on consistency with the provisions of the 
1992 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions.167 The Committee re-stated its view that 
the rule of law is paramount no matter how unpalatable the decisions of national 
courts might be.168 The concerns of the Spanish and industry observer delegations 
surrounded both the liability of the insurer and the master. On the first, the 
Committee was of the view that the proceedings in the UK had confirmed that there 
should be no liability over and above the CLC limit.169 However, on the liability of 
the master, it was the Committee’s view that recklessness was not sufficient reason 
to deny immunity under the channelling provisions because it had been found by the 
courts that the master’s actions did not cause the damage.170 At that point in time, 
appeal proceedings were pending before the Spanish Constitutional Court, but leave
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to appeal was subsequently denied.171 There may yet be a case brought by the mas-
ter to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
7 . C O N C L U S I O N S
The ‘Erika’ and ‘Prestige’ disasters, along with the related case law, provide for an
interesting case study on the application of the PPP. This deceptively simple
principle sits in front of layers of complexity and has no clear or agreed definition.
However, what can be identified in this examination of liability for marine oil pollu-
tion is that the PPP is developing and sometimes in different directions. At EU level,
there is clearly an appetite to broaden the application of the principle to bring in re-
sponsible parties excluded by the international regime and to recognise that responsi-
bility can also lie with exposing the marine environment to risk. In France and Spain,
we see a similar pattern in exposing more responsible parties to liability but also the
expansion of the principle to cover pure environmental damage. Alongside these
developments, the international regime has also adopted a broader application of
the principle over time, although it currently remains resistant to change on the
channelling of liability, limits and compensation for pure environmental damage.
In the discrete but global sphere of marine oil pollution law it is also possible to
see potential for influence across jurisdictions in the way the PPP finds its form and
legal effect. Although rejected, it is interesting to note the suggestion in the Court of
Justice of applying the ‘user pays principle’ and extending liability to the public. This
approach concords with the position of the international regime. Also, if similar ques-
tions of supplementary liability were to be raised today, in the light of the specific ex-
clusion of accidental oil pollution incidents covered by the international regime from
the subsequently adopted Environmental Liability Directive,172 would the outcome
be similar? There is a clear message from the Directive that supplementary liability is
not to be considered.173 The decisions of the Cour de Cassation and the Spanish
Supreme Court, on the other hand, suggest that liability can be effectively extended
to other polluting parties within the confines of international obligations. The deci-
sions appear to sweep aside the traditional assumptions of near unbreakable limits
on liability and strict channelling of liability and open the door for liability to be
extended to other parties including classification societies and insurers who cross the
recklessness threshold. However, this may yet be subject to challenge in the ECHR.
The firm stance of the international regime on environmental damage per se was
only formalised in 1984174 after a claim to the IOPC funds from the USSR for dam-
age to the marine environment from an oil spill from the tanker ‘Antonio Gramsci’
based on a mathematical model prescribed by national legislation. The 1984
Protocol did not actually come into force until 1996 and, in the meantime, there
were several other claims for damage to the marine environment per se which were
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allowed by Italian Courts.175 At the current time, the position of the international re-
gime remains firm on the question of pure environmental damage. However, given 
the acceptance of natural resource damage under the US Oil Pollution Act176 and 
the EU Environmental Liability Directive,177 which largely follows the USA on nat-
ural resource damage there is continued pressure for change.178
What this examination also reveals is the tangible problems in identifying the ‘pol-
luter’ in complicated global transactions. In the case of both vessels, there was a com-
plex web of ownership with potentially responsible parties sheltering behind shell 
companies. The discussion above also identifies a potential danger that, in side-lining 
the traditional liability provisions in the international conventions, some parties may 
be over paying, whilst those who are implicated by the virtue of being end users of 
the product escape any contribution to the cost of remedying damage when disaster 
strikes. Ultimately, Total bore all the additional costs of the clean-up in the 
Commune de Mesquer flowing from the ‘Erika’ disaster, although they had paid their 
contribution to the international fund, and the State was fully compensated. It is also 
important to bear in mind that, although firmly entrenched in EU law, the PPP is 
not as fully embraced at an international level. Furthermore, the international liability 
regime, currently in place, operates in a very different legal sphere, with its own tradi-
tions and norms. Crucially, it provides an arrangement that strikes a compromise 
position between the interests of powerful global players and the protection and re-
mediation of the environment. It should also be remembered that the prolonged 
period of legal repercussions surrounding liability, which followed the ‘Erika’ and 
‘Prestige’ pollution incidents is unusual. Most claims are settled under the inter-
national conventions fully and without recourse to the courts. It is only in the most 
devastating of pollution incidents, that the fund has, in the past, not been able to 
meet the full costs of damage and since then, levels of liability have been extended.
In an ideal world, the law would ensure that there are adequate resources to repair 
any level of damage sustained and provide full compensation for damage to both 
legal persons and the environment. In such a world, there would be no compromise 
where the environment is concerned and every party responsible would pay their fair 
share of liability flowing from a pollution incident. There would also be no escaping 
liability through complex ownership arrangements and the use of ‘shell’ companies. 
In the meantime, it has been some time since a major incident of this sort hit the 
headlines and the full introduction of double hulled vessels may mean that there will 
be fewer in the future.179 Calls for changes to the international regime have, to a de-
gree, subsided as have fears that its future is in jeopardy.
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At present, the PPP cannot be perceived as a high level transnational norm.
However, as we see from the case law flowing from the ‘Erika’ and ‘Prestige’ disas-
ters, the courts can serve to foster legal innovation and play a role in providing the
link between outcomes and concrete rules.180 They form an important part of creat-
ing a legal history for the PPP and in so doing contribute to the formation of a legal
identity for the principle. Furthermore, through this examination of the international
regime and the case law, it is possible to identify cross-fertilisation between jurisdic-
tions and levels of governance as the PPP develops in discrete legal settings.181
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